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Abstract: The aim of the paper is to develop a discrete time version of a one-sector optimal 
growth model with endogenous time preference. The intertemporal discount rate is 
determined by social factors (i.e., factors that are external to the individual agent), namely 
the economy wide levels of consumption and income. In continuous time, the combined 
effect of the previous factors is known to eventually produce local indeterminacy, instead of 
the well known saddle-path equilibrium of the standard Ramsey model. In discrete time, the 
possibility of local indeterminacy is explored under several types of Ramsey models with 
endogenous time preference: neo-classical and endogenous growth models, and models 
with production externalities and endogenous labor supply. Besides finding various 
possibilities regarding local dynamics, we also find that one of the models can give place to 
endogenous fluctuations, although this occurs only under rather exceptional circumstances. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Ramsey growth model constitutes a fundamental tool regarding the analysis 
of material accumulation and of patterns of consumption over time. It is sufficiently 
flexible to explain different patterns of growth, arising from distinct technological 
conditions, different patterns of preferences or different assumptions regarding the 
shape of the production function, the economic properties attached to its inputs or the 
way one understands capital depreciation and obsolescence. One of the factors that 
exerts influence over the outcome of the growth model is the kind of rate of time 
preference one considers. Typically, economists have almost always adopted a constant 
rate of time preference. This is more the result of an analytical convenience than an 
assumption with strong empirical support.  
For instance, Boyarchenko and Levendorskii (2005) identify a set of anomalies 
attached to the notion of a constant discount rate; these problems are the following: first, 
there is evidence that, in reality, the discounting is hyperbolic, i.e., the instantaneous 
discount rate decreases with time or, in other words, individuals discount over short 
horizons at a higher rate than over long horizons [some models that explore dynamic 
choices under hyperbolic discounting include Laibson (1997), Barro (1999) and 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), just to cite a few]. Second, a sign effect is plausible to 
occur, i.e., it is likely to have gains discounted more strongly than losses; arguments in 
favour of this evidence are found in work concerning the psychology of decisions as it 
is the case of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman (2003). Third, a delay-
speedup asymmetry, relating to the idea that if a change of the delivery time of an 
outcome is perceived as a acceleration from some reference point, then the discount rate 
is larger than if the change is perceived as a delay, relatively to that reference point. 
Fourth, it is possible to imagine a negative discounting for losses, since many times the 
agent prefers to expedite payments or other losses. Fifth, there is clearly, in practice, a 
magnitude effect, in the sense that small outcomes are more strongly discounted when 
compared with large outcomes. Finally, there is a stronger preference, or a higher 
impatience, regarding improving sequences. A detailed discussion concerning the 
previous effects over the representative agent discounting of future outcomes can be 
found in Frederick, Loewenstein and Donoghue (2002).  
The above paragraph elucidates about the great variety of forces involving the 
subjective choice of a discount rate or rate of time preference. It also allows to perceive 
that, certainly, many of the forces that influence such choice are endogenous both to the 
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representative individual relatively to which some economic problem is stated and 
solved, but also to the economic system as a whole. In the model to develop below, 
some of these influences are assumed; specifically, we will focus on the economy wide 
determinants of the individual rate of intertemporal preference. 
Basically, in the literature, two candidates for explaining the rate of time 
preference as endogenous are normally taken. In the tradition of Uzawa (1968) and 
Epstein (1987), these are the level of consumption and the level of income. The main 
assumptions tend to be synchronized with the empirical evidence, that is, rising 
consumption levels tend to imply rising impatience (a higher discount rate), while rising 
income tends to generate more patient individuals (a lower discount rate).  
In this paper, we will follow closely the work by Meng (2006), who develops a 
model of endogenous time preference where the factors affecting the individual 
discount rate are the economy wide aggregate levels of consumption and income. The 
influence of individual levels of consumption and income is overlooked, and only 
aggregate levels are considered. The influence of such factors has been also thoroughly 
documented in the literature [see the references in Meng (2006)] and it comes from 
logical arguments: a jealousy effect explains the presence of aggregate consumption as a 
determinant of the time preference (higher consumption levels in society imply 
increasing impatience), while the economy’s income positive impact over patience is 
meaningful under the idea that a wealthier society produces less impatient individuals 
(in what concerns the timing of consumption). 
As stated, we develop the same model as Meng (2006), including the two 
variations he considers (technological externalities and endogenous labor supply), in 
discrete time. This analysis is relevant if one wants to confirm if the local indeterminacy 
result of the continuous time setup continues to hold when one changes the assumed 
notion of time. We find that, under neo-classical growth, local indeterminacy is a 
possible stability outcome, but we cannot exclude the presence of saddle-path stability 
or instability, depending on the specific values of parameters. We also analyze simple 
one sector endogenous growth models with endogenous time preference, and conclude 
that, under the chosen specification, the system will rest always over a bifurcation line 
and, hence, local indeterminacy is ruled out.  
Relatively to the two extensions, an endogenous labor supply – endogenous 
growth specification does not allow for finding local indeterminacy for reasonable 
parameter values, while the model with production externalities, besides reintroducing 
the possibility of indeterminacy, is the only one capable of displaying endogenous 
Socially Determined Time Preference in Discrete Time 4 
 
fluctuations. These fluctuations are triggered by a flip bifurcation that generates a period 
doubling process that culminates in the presence of chaotic motion. Such outcome is 
rare, occurring only for extreme values of parameters; nevertheless, we cannot exclude 
it, and thus we add a new candidate explanation for the possibility of endogenous 
business cycles, alongside with the ones already explored in the literature: increasing 
returns / production externalities with a constant discount rate [Christiano and Harrison 
(1999), Schmitt-Grohé (2000), Guo and Lansing (2002)], learning [Cellarier (2006)] or 
financial development [Caballé, Jarque and Michetti (2006)], just to cite some of the 
most meaningful.  
To be precise, the eventual presence of endogenous business cycles under an 
endogenously determined rate of time preference is not a completely new result; 
Drugeon (1998) assumes an endogenous time preference rate that depends both on the 
individual level of consumption and the aggregate level of consumption. His findings 
point to the presence of ‘sustained oscillation motion’, that is, endogenous fluctuations. 
Our model adds the result of endogenous cycles in a setup where time preference is 
exclusively determined by economy wide factors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following sequence. Section 2 
describes the model. Section 3 explores its main local stability conditions under neo-
classical growth. Section 4 studies stability conditions under endogenous growth. In 
sections 5 and 6, two variations of the model are analyzed: a production externalities / 
increasing returns framework and an endogenous leisure - endogenous growth setup. 
Section 7 is destined to a brief remark about global dynamics and the presence of 
endogenous cycles in one of the models. Section 8 concludes.    
 
2. Meng’s Model in Discrete Time 
 
The benchmark model to consider is a discrete time version of the continuous time 
growth model with socially determined time preference developed in Meng (2006). 
Consider an economy where a representative agent intends to maximize a sequence of 
utility functions from the present time moment, t=0, to infinity, t→∞. This sequence of 
utility functions is presented as follows, 
 
∑ ∏+∞
= = 








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
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⋅=
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vvt YCcUU β  (1) 
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In equation (1), ct≥0 represents the agent’s real consumption at moment t, U(ct) is 
the consumption utility function, β(Cv,Yv) respects to the discount factor, and Cv and Yv 
are, respectively, the economy wide average levels of consumption and income at time 
v. These two variables are standard (or average) values determined by the whole society 
and that serve as a reference for the individual agent in setting up her degree of 
impatience regarding consumption (i.e., her intertemporal discount rate). We will use 
interchangeably the terms discount rate and rate of time preference; these are not 
necessarily the same when endogenous discounting is assumed, but according to Meng 
(2006) they coincide when the discount rate is determined solely by economy wide 
factors. 
A conventional CIES utility function is assumed, i.e., )1/()1()( 1 θθ −−= −tt ccU , 
with }1/{),0( +∞∈θ  the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This 
function fulfils the main requirements concerning consumption utility stylized facts, i.e., 
marginal utility is positive (U’>0) but diminishing (U’’<0). 
The resource constraint is a trivial one. We just consider a capital accumulation 
equation, where kt≥0 represents the stock of capital and δ≥0 is the depreciation rate: 
 
tttt kcyk ⋅−+−=+ )1(1 δ , k0 given (2) 
 
Variable yt≥0 corresponds to the representative agent’s level of income. Income 
respects to output as given by a conventional neo-classical production function, yt=f(kt). 
Function f exhibits positive and decreasing marginal returns (f’>0, f’’<0), and, for the 
analytical treatment of the model, we just take a Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
α
tt kAy ⋅= , with A>0 the technological level and α∈(0,1) the output-capital elasticity. 
The economy wide level of income at time t can be presented as Yt=f(Kt). 
To solve the problem of maximization of (1) subject to (2), we build up the 
Hamiltonian function, 
 
[ ]tttttttt kckfqYCcUqck ⋅−−⋅⋅+=ℵ + δβ )(),()(),,( 1  (3) 
 
In expression (3), qt respects to the current-value co-state variable (shadow-price) 
of kt. First-order conditions are:  
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θβ −+ =⋅⇒=ℵ ttc cqYC 1),(0  (4) 
 
[ ] 1)1(1 ),(1),( +−−+ ⋅⋅−⋅⋅+=⇒−ℵ=−⋅ tttktt qYCkAqqqYC βδαβ α  (5) 
 
0),(lim =⋅⋅
+∞→
t
t
t
t
qYCk β   (transversality condition) (6) 
 
In equilibrium, we have Ct=ct and Yt=yt; thus, ),(),( tt ycYC ββ =  in optimality 
conditions (4) to (6). Combining (4) and (5), the following equation of motion for the 
representative agent’s level of consumption holds,  
 
( )[ ] ttttt ckAycc ⋅−⋅⋅+⋅= −−++ θα δαβ /1)1(11 1),(  (7) 
 
The dynamic system relatively to which stability conditions will be discussed is 
composed by equations (2) and (7). Once again, we call the attention for the similarities 
between our model and the continuous time version of Meng (2006). As he says, “Note 
that compared with the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with a constant 
discount rate, the only difference is that here in Eq. (9) the discount rate depends on 
consumption and capital, whereas the resource equation (10) remains unchanged.” 
page 2676. Equation (9) in Meng’s presentation corresponds to a continuous-time 
version of (7), while his equation (10) has correspondence on our equation (2). The time 
preference is exogenous to the agent and, hence, it does not disturb the way optimality 
conditions are derived. Nevertheless, optimality implies a coincidence between 
aggregates’ values from the economy wide point of view and from the point of view of 
the individual agent. 
The signs of the derivatives of the discount factor function in equation (7) are the 
following: βc<0 and βy>0. These conditions intend to make the model close to the 
empirical evidence. They state that the individual rate of time preference increases with 
the economy’s level of consumption, that is, individual impatience rises when the agent 
observes higher levels of consumption in society. This is a jealousy effect; average 
consumption matters to the isolated individual in the sense that the willingness to defer 
consumption in time falls as one sees the overall consumption level rising. This jealousy 
effect arises in contrast to a wealth effect. When the income of the whole society 
increases, the isolated agent will be more willing to defer consumption, that is, patience 
Socially Determined Time Preference in Discrete Time 7 
 
rises. Thus, the rate of time preference falls with an increase in the economy’s living 
standard. This offsetting effect of two countervailing forces leads, in the continuous 
time version of the model, to local indeterminacy. In the following sections, we ask if 
this result continues to hold in discrete time.     
 
3. Endogenous Impatience and Neo-Classical Growth 
 
3.1 Linearity in the Discount Rate  
 
In a first version of the model, we consider that the discount rate is linear in its 
arguments (as does Meng). This implies writing the discount factor as 
)),(1/(1),( tttt ycyc ρβ += , with tttt ycyc ⋅−⋅+= 210),( ρρρρ ; parameters 210 ,, ρρρ  
are all positive values, given the reasoning developed in the last paragraph of the 
previous section. 
The following assumption is central on the development of the model, and it 
allows for obtaining tractable local stability results, 
 
Assumption 1. The steady state discount rate is 0
* ρρ = . 
 
The above assumption states that the jealousy effect and the wealth effect are such 
that they offset each other in the steady state. Under assumption 1, the steady state may 
be characterized as in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. Defining a balanced growth path / steady state as the set of 
constant values ( ** ,ck ) that is obtained for tt kkk =≡ +1*  and tt ccc =≡ +1* , such 
balanced growth path exists and it is unique. 
 
Proof: If, in the steady state, assumption 1 holds, then the following relation also 
holds: α
ρ
ρ )( *
1
2* kAc ⋅⋅= . From constraint (2), we find a second relation between the 
steady state levels of consumption and capital, which is *
21
2* kc ⋅
−
⋅
=
ρρ
δρ
. By solving a 
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system with these two relations, a unique pair ( ** ,ck ) is found; this is 
)1/(1
1
21* )(
α
δρ
ρρ −






⋅
−⋅
=
Ak , 
)1/(
21
)1/(1
1
2
*
ααα
δ
ρρ
ρ
ρ
−
−





 −
⋅





⋅=
A
c  
 
The steady state result derived in the proof of proposition 1 deserves a few 
comments. First, as one should expect, the higher is the technology level and the lower 
is the depreciation rate, the higher are the steady state levels of capital and consumption. 
Second, the steady state as presented implies some constraints over parameters, 
i) 21 ρρ ≥ . This condition guarantees non-negative *k  and *c ; 
ii) δ
ρρ
ραρρ ⋅
−
⋅−−
=
21
12
0
)1(
. This constraint comes from the steady state 
evaluation of (7). Observe that the steady state rate of time preference is proportional to 
the rate of capital depreciation. If capital does not depreciate, the representative agent 
will not discount future consumption. This is the result of considering that the jealousy 
effect and the economy’s output effect offset each other over the balanced growth path; 
iii) 12 )1( ραρ ⋅−≥ . This boundary constraint avoids the existence of a negative 
discount rate. 
One of our main purposes consists on understanding if the indeterminacy result 
found in continuous time for 0,, 210 >ρρρ  continues to hold under the discrete time 
version of the model. To undertake such an evaluation, we linearize (2) and (7) in the 
steady state vicinity to obtain the following matricial system, 
 








−
−
⋅










+⋅
⋅
−
+⋅−⋅
⋅⋅⋅−
+
⋅−
⋅⋅
⋅





⋅−−
+
⋅
−+
=








−
−
+
+
*
*
0
*
1
021
2
21
21
21
0
*
0
*
1
*
1
)1()1()(
)1(
1)()1(1
11
cc
kk
cc
cc
kk
t
t
t
t
ρθ
ρ
ρρρθ
δρρα
θρρ
δρρδα
ρ
α
ρ   (8) 
 
Stability conditions are presented in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Local indeterminacy [i.e., fixed-point stability or the presence of 
two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (8) inside the unit circle] requires the validity 
of the following conditions, 
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[ ] 0)1(
)1(2
)1()(
)1()2(2
0
*
1
021
2
21
0 >+⋅
⋅⋅⋅−−
−
+⋅−⋅
⋅⋅⋅−
++⋅
ρθ
ρδα
ρρρθ
δρραρ c  
0)1(
)1(
21
2*
0
1 >





−
⋅
−⋅
+⋅
⋅⋅−
ρρ
δρ
ρθ
δρα
c  
[ ] 0)1(
)1(1
0
0
*
1 >−
+⋅
⋅⋅⋅−− ρ
ρθ
ρδα c
. 
 
Proof: The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in system (8) are 
)1()1()(
)1(2)(
0
*
1
021
2
21
0 ρθ
ρ
ρρρθ
δρραρ
+⋅
⋅
−
+⋅−⋅
⋅⋅⋅−
++=
cJTr  
[ ]
)1(
)1(11)(
0
*
1
0 ρθ
ρδαρ
+⋅
⋅⋅⋅−−
−+=
cJDet  
The stability conditions in the proposition are just the trivial conditions that 
guarantee that the two eigenvalues of J lie inside the unit circle, 0)()(1 >++ JDetJTr , 
0)()(1 >+− JDetJTr  and 0)(1 >− JDet  
 
Stability conditions in proposition 2 are not very informative. One understands 
that local indeterminacy is guaranteed for some combinations of parameter values but 
that this is not surely a universal result. The following corollary narrows the possibility 
of local indeterminacy to values of the technology parameter above a given combination 
of parameters. 
 
Corollary 1. 
21
1
ρρ
δρ
−
⋅
>A  is a necessary condition for local indeterminacy. 
 
The above condition is obtained from the second inequality of proposition 2; the 
condition presented in the corollary is equivalent to 
21
2*
ρρ
δρ
−
⋅
>c . 
A numerical example allows for a better understanding of the model’s dynamics. 
We will attribute concrete values to every parameter except θ; this is our bifurcation 
parameter. We adopt α=0.3 [as in Meng (2006)]; the depreciation rate is the one 
assumed in the calibration of a growth model by Guo and Lansing (2002), δ=0.067 
[Meng’s model ignores capital depreciation; in our model we have stated before the 
importance of this parameter, since if no depreciation exists, then there is not, as well, 
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steady state discounting]; we take ρ1=0.2, and given the constraint on ρ2 (in this case, 
0.14≤ρ2≤0.2), we choose to work with ρ2=0.16. Under these parameter values, the 
steady state discount rate is ρ0=0.0335. 
To highlight the result in corollary 1, we take, separately, two values for the 
technology index; first, we consider A=0.2 and, subsequently, we take A=0.4. Under the 
selected parameter values, local indeterminacy imposes A>0.335; therefore, the first 
case implies that indeterminacy is not an admissible stability result, while the second 
case, with A above the computed threshold value, means that we may find 
indeterminacy if the first and third conditions of proposition 2 are satisfied as well. 
Let us begin by addressing the case A=0.2. Our numerical example involves the 
following steady state values for consumption and capital: 1823.0* =c  and 
4786.0* =k . The Jacobian matrix is presentable as 





−
−
=
θθ /0328.01/0003.0
10335.1
J . 
Stability conditions are 0163.00)()(1 >⇒>++ θJDetJTr , 
0/0008.00)()(1 >−⇒>+− θJDetJTr  and 003.10)(1 <⇒>− θJDet . We confirm 
that for a positive value of the utility function parameter, local indeterminacy never 
holds (second condition is false). First and third conditions imply that for a given 
interval of values of θ, saddle-path stability is observable (to be precise, saddle-path 
stability holds for 003.10163.0 << θ ); outside such interval, instability will prevail. 
This stability result may be depicted graphically, on a trace-determinant diagram. 
Regard that θ/0328.00335.2)( −=JTr  and θ/0336.00335.1)( −=JDet ; thus, a 
relation between trace and determinant is easily computed: 
0488.1)(0244.1)( −⋅= JTrJDet . Figure 1 draws this line in a trace-determinant 
diagram, where one observes that the local indeterminacy area (inside the inverted 
triangle formed by the bifurcation lines) is never crossed. The represented line is limited 
from above, since as the trace of matrix J reaches 2.0355, parameter θ becomes an 
infinite value.  
 
*** Figure 1 *** 
 
Consider now the second example, A=0.4. The steady state values of the 
endogenous variables are 4907.0* =c  and 2883.1* =k . The Jacobian matrix will be 






−
−
=
θθ /0925.01/0051.0
10335.1
J . As before, one computes stability conditions: 
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0442.00)()(1 >⇒>++ θJDetJTr , 0/0051.00)()(1 >⇒>+− θJDetJTr  and 
6089.20)(1 <⇒>− θJDet . Thus, in this case local indeterminacy exists as long as 
6089.20442.0 << θ . Once again, the result becomes more clear if presented 
graphically; note that θ/0925.00335.2)( −=JTr  and θ/0874.00335.1)( −=JDet , 
and, therefore, the trace-determinant relation will be: 8876.0)(9449.0)( −⋅= JTrJDet . 
Comparing the expression of this line with the one in the previous example, we observe 
that both lines have to end in the point Tr(J)=2.0335, since this is the point where the 
utility function parameter becomes infinite (the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
becomes zero); furthermore, this second line is less sloped, and it is precisely this 
characteristic that will make the line enter the stability / indeterminacy inverted triangle. 
Stability / indeterminacy will hold for 6089.20442.0 << θ , instability prevails if 
6089.2>θ  and saddle-path stability requires 0442.0<θ . See figure 2. 
 
*** Figure 2 *** 
 
3.2 Linearity in the Discount Factor 
 
The possibility of an indeterminacy result explored above has taken a specific 
functional form for the socially determined discount function. In this subsection, we 
investigate if such result is similar for an alternative specification of such function. 
Specifically, we now assume, instead of linearity in the discount rate, linearity in the 
discount factor, i.e., we take YC ⋅+⋅−= 210 ββββ . The signals in the expression have 
changed relatively to the linear discount rate function, but they intend to express the 
same as before: a high discount factor is synonymous of more patience (low discount 
rate), while a low discount factor means less patience (high discount rate). Therefore, 
[ ]1,0,, 210 ∈βββ . 
Assumption 2 is similar to assumption 1. 
 
Assumption 2. The steady state discount factor is 0
* ββ = .  
 
Given assumption 2, the balanced growth path result is close to the one in 
proposition 1. Once again, the steady state point ( ** ,ck ) exists and it is unique. Under 
assumption 2, condition αβ
β )( *
1
2* kAc ⋅⋅=  holds, and, therefore, given resource 
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constraint (2), the steady state values of capital and consumption are 
)1/(1
1
21* )(
α
δβ
ββ −






⋅
−⋅
=
Ak  and 
)1/(
21
)1/(1
1
2
*
ααα
δ
ββ
ββ
−
−





 −
⋅





⋅=
A
c . In this case, the 
inequality 21 ββ ≥  must be satisfied. Replacing the steady state values in the difference 
equation concerning the motion of the consumption variable, the following value for β0 
is obtained: 
121
21
0 )()1( βδαββδ
βββ
⋅⋅+−⋅−
−
= . Because β0≤1 must be verified, a new 
constraint emerges: 12 )1( βαβ ⋅−≥ . 
Similarly to the discount rate linear function, we proceed with the local analysis of 
the dynamics of the model. The linearized system in the steady state vicinity is now 
 








−
−
⋅






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
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
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−
−
⋅⋅
⋅⋅−+
⋅−⋅
⋅⋅⋅
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

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⋅
−
−
−
=








−
−
+
+
*
*
*
0
1
21
1
*
0
210
*
1
0*2
0
*
1
*
1
)1(1)(
1
1/1
cc
kk
c
k
c
k
cc
kk
t
t
t
t
θβ
β
ββ
δβαβ
α
θβββ
δβαβαβ
β   (9) 
 
Proposition 3 presents the stability conditions, 
 
Proposition 3. In the linear discount factor function case, local indeterminacy 
requires the following inequalities to be satisfied, 
 
[ ] 0)1(2)1(12 *
0
1
21
1
*
0
0
0 >⋅




 ⋅⋅−−
−
−
⋅⋅
⋅⋅−+




 +
⋅
θβ
βδα
ββ
δβαβ
αβ
β c
k
 
0)1()1(
*
21
1
*
0
0
1 >⋅





−
⋅⋅
⋅⋅−−
⋅⋅−
θββ
δβαβ
αβ
βδα c
k
 
[ ] 0)1()1(1 0
*
1 >−−
⋅
⋅⋅−− β
θ
βδα c  
 
Proof: The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in system (9) are: 
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θβ
β
ββ
δβαβ
αβ
β *
0
1
21
1
*
0
0
0 )1(1)( c
k
JTr ⋅





−
−
⋅⋅
⋅⋅−+
+
=  and 
[ ]
θβ
βδαβ ⋅
⋅
⋅⋅−−−=
0
*
1
0
)1(11)( cJDet . Applying the same set of stability conditions as 
in proposition 2, we arrive to the obtained inequalities 
 
Corollary 2. A necessary condition for stability is 
[ ] αα
α
ββδβαδββ
δβα
)()1()( 21)1(2121
1
1
−⋅⋅⋅+−⋅−
⋅⋅
>
−⋅
−
A . This condition is obtained directly 
from the second stability expression in proposition 3. 
 
To further discuss local dynamics recover the numerical example used before. 
Namely, assume, once again, α=0.3 and δ=0.067. Take also β1=0.2 and β2=0.16 (these 
values have correspondence in ρ1 and ρ2 of the previous analysis only for analytical 
convenience; note that given the other parameter values we had to select a value of β2 
obeying 0.14≤β2≤0.2). In this case, β0=0.9676 (which corresponds to a discount rate of 
ρ0=0.0335, which is precisely the same found in our first case). The indeterminacy 
necessary condition in the above corollary is, under our example, A>1.3108. Thus, this 
second case requires a higher technology level for local indeterminacy to prevail. 
Consider two examples: first, A=0.2 and, second, A=2. For A=0.2, the Jacobian 
matrix of system (9) is 





−−
−
=
θθ /0117.01/0238.0
10335.1
J . The corresponding trace and 
determinant are θ/0117.00335.2)( −=JTr  and θ/0359.00335.1)( −=JDet . Stability 
conditions, as presented in proposition 3, indicate that indeterminacy is absent 
(according to the condition in corollary 2, the value of the technology index is lower 
than the one necessary to find such outcome); stability conditions applied to our 
example also say that saddle-path stability exists for 0.0117<θ<1.0716, while for any 
other value of the utility function parameter, instability will be evidenced.  
The absence of local indeterminacy can also be verified by looking at the line that 
relates trace and determinant; in this case, this is 2051.5)(0684.3)( −⋅= JTrJDet . We 
refrain from representing this line graphically, since it is located qualitatively in the 
same position as the line in figure 1, i.e., given that its slope is above unity, the line will 
be below (to the right) of bifurcation line 0)()(1 =+− JDetJTr ; thus, the region inside 
the unit circle is never crossed by the computed line. 
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The other example, with A=2, will be similar to the one characterized in figure 2. 
The slope of the trace-determinant line will be below one, and therefore this line will be 
located, partially, inside the unit circle. In this particular case, 441.3* =c  and 
8396.12* =k  are the steady state values of variables. The Jacobian matrix comes 






−
−
=
θθ /693.01/0383.0
10335.1
J . Trace and determinant are θ/693.00335.2)( −=JTr  
and θ/6779.00335.1)( −=JDet . Stability conditions are all satisfied under 
0.161<θ<20.236. Above the upper bound for θ, the system becomes unstable, and for 
θ<0.161, saddle-path stability prevails. This result is identical (in qualitative terms) to 
the one found for the discount rate linearity case (for the level of technology above a 
given threshold value). Once more, the trace-determinant relation is straightforwardly 
computed: 9557.0)(9782.0)( −⋅= JTrJDet . Because the slope of this line is below 
one, we guarantee that the indeterminacy area is crossed, on a way very similar to the 
one discussed with figure 2. 
Our main conclusion is that indeterminacy results will not defer significantly if 
one considers a linear discount rate function or a linear discount factor function. In both 
cases, relatively high technology levels guarantee local indeterminacy, as long as the 
utility function parameter stays within a given interval.  
 
4. Endogenous Impatience and Endogenous Growth 
 
The previous model is now adapted to a scenario of endogenous growth. 
Basically, two different assumptions are considered relatively to the benchmark setup. 
First, the neo-classical production function gives place to an AK production function; 
second, instead of assuming a discount factor function ),( tt ycβ  (linear in ρ or in β), we 
consider a function )ˆ,ˆ( tt ycβ , where tcˆ  and tyˆ  represent detrended consumption and 
income variables, i.e., considering that the original variables  grow, under a balanced 
growth path, at rate γ, we have 
t
t
t
c
c )1(ˆ γ+≡  and t
t
t
y
y )1(ˆ γ+≡ ; likewise, we define 
t
t
t
kk )1(
ˆ
γ+
≡ . The optimal control problem of utility maximization is solved as the 
original model, and, considering the detrended variables, the system we want to analyze 
is composed by the following two equations, 
 
Socially Determined Time Preference in Discrete Time 15 
 
ttt ck
Ak ˆ
1
1
ˆ
1
1
ˆ
1 ⋅+
−⋅
+
−+
=+ γγ
δ
 (10) 
 
[ ] tttt cAkcc ˆ1 1)1()ˆ,ˆ(ˆ /11 ⋅+⋅−+⋅=+ γδβ θ  (11) 
 
We will study the dynamics as before, first by assuming linearity in the discount 
rate and, on a second moment, by taking linearity in the discount factor. 
Consider first )ˆ1/(1)ˆ,ˆ( ttt yc ρβ += , with ttt YC ˆˆˆ 210 ⋅−⋅+= ρρρρ . Variables tCˆ  
and tYˆ  correspond to consumption and income average social levels (detrended), which, 
in equilibrium, enter in the decision process of the individual agent as endogenous 
variables. In this case, and reconsidering that 0
*
ˆ ρρ = , we obtain a steady-state 
consumption-capital ratio: A
k
c
⋅=
1
2
*
*
ˆ
ˆ
ρ
ρ
; since consumption and capital grow at a same 
steady-state rate, this ratio is also equal to 
*
*
k
c
. Using the ratio to evaluate (10) in the 
steady-state, the growth rate of the considered aggregates is obtained; the result is 
δ
ρ
ρργ −⋅−= A
1
21
. As before, we assume 21 ρρ ≥ . Finally, the evaluation of (11) in 
the steady state requires 1)1(
1
0 −
+
−+
= θγ
δρ A . To guarantee a positive ρ0, we must have 
)1ln(
)1ln(
γ
δθ
+
−+
<
A
. 
The study of local dynamics is undertaken through the linearization of system 
(10), (11) in the steady state vicinity. Note that the balanced growth path is 
characterized by a unique consumption-capital ratio and an equilibrium growth rate that 
can be positive, zero or negative. The linearized system is 
 








−
−
⋅












⋅+
⋅
−
⋅+
⋅⋅
+
−
+
−+
=








−
−
+
+
*
*
0
*
1
0
*
2*1
*
1
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
)1(
ˆ
1)1(
ˆ
1
1
1
1
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
cc
kk
ccA
A
cc
kk
t
t
t
t
θρ
ρ
θρ
ρ
γγ
δ
  (12) 
 
Proposition 4 refers to the indeterminacy / stability result. 
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Proposition 4. In the endogenous growth model with a linear discount rate 
function, local indeterminacy cannot hold. 
 
Proof: The result is easy to achieve once the trace and the determinant are 
computed: 
θρ
ρ
γ
δ
⋅+
⋅
−
+
−+
+= )1(
ˆ
1
11)(
0
*
1 cAJTr  
θρ
ρ
γ
δ
⋅+
⋅
−
+
−+
= )1(
ˆ
1
1)(
0
*
1 cAJDet  
One observes that 1)()( −= JTrJDet  and, thus, the system will rest over the 
bifurcation line 0)()(1 =+− JDetJTr , the same is to say that one of the eigenvalues of 
the Jacobian matrix is equal to 1 independently of the values of parameters 
 
Let us re-examine the model with a linear discount factor function: 
ttt YC ˆˆˆ 210 ⋅+⋅−= ββββ . Steady state results are: Ak
c
⋅=
1
2
*
*
ˆ
ˆ
β
β
, δβ
ββγ −⋅−= A
1
21
 and 
δ
γβ
θ
−+
+
=
A1
)1(
0 . We must guarantee 21 ββ ≥  and, as before, )1ln(
)1ln(
γ
δθ
+
−+
<
A
. 
Linearization yields, 
 








−
−
⋅












⋅
⋅
−
⋅
⋅⋅
+
−
+
−+
=








−
−
+
+
*
*
0
*
1
0
*
2*1
*
1
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
1
ˆ
1
1
1
1
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
cc
kk
ccA
A
cc
kk
t
t
t
t
θβ
β
θβ
β
γγ
δ
  (13) 
 
Trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix are: 
θβ
β
γ
δ
⋅
⋅
−
+
−+
+=
0
*
1 ˆ
1
11)( cAJTr  
θβ
β
γ
δ
⋅
⋅
−
+
−+
=
0
*
1 ˆ
1
1)( cAJDet  
A same type of result as the one in the previous specification is obtained, i.e., 
0)()(1 =+− JDetJTr  holds, and therefore local indeterminacy is never found since 
one of the eigenvalues of J stays over the unit circle. 
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5. Production Externalities 
 
We consider in this section a variation of the benchmark neo-classical model that 
is also able to generate indeterminacy. This variation modifies two of the fundamental 
hypothesis of the model. First, we introduce an externality in production, and thus 
production may be subject to increasing returns to scale; second, we let the discounting 
function depend only on the aggregate level of consumption [as in the externalities 
version of Meng’s model]. Analytically, these two assumptions are translated as 
follows, 
i) ),( ttt Kkfy = . We take a Cobb-Douglas production function ηα ttt KkAy ⋅⋅= , 
with η∈(0,1); 
ii) ))(1/(1)( tt CC ρβ += , with tt CC ⋅+= 10)( ρρρ . We consider only the linear 
discount rate function case, since, as in the benchmark neo-classical model, the linear 
discount factor case produces very similar results. 
Solving the model for the representative agent, one will have 
 
tttt kckAk ⋅−+−⋅=
+
+ )1(1 δηα  (14) 
 
[ ]( )[ ] tttt ckAcc ⋅−⋅⋅++⋅= +−−++ θηα δηαβ /1)(111 )(1)(  (15) 
 
A new assumption regarding the steady state level of the discount rate is needed, 
 
Assumption 3. The steady state discount rate is some constant 0* ρρ > . 
 
Under assumption 3, the following result is straightforward, 
 
Proposition 5. In the socially determined time preference model with externalities 
in the production of final goods and as long as assumption 3 holds, the steady state 
exists and it is unique. 
 
Proof: Under assumption 3, the discount function implies the following balanced 
growth path value for consumption: 
1
0
*
*
ρ
ρρ −
=c . From (15), a unique steady state 
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stock of capital is determined: 
[ ])(1/1
*
* )(
ηα
δρ
ηα +−






+
⋅+
=
Ak . Finally, the steady state is 
also characterized by the existence of some *ρ  equilibrium value; from equation (14), 
one understands that this value is the solution of the equation 
[ ] [ ])(1/1
*
)(1/)(
*
1
0
* )()( ηαηαηα
δρ
ηαδδρ
ηα
ρ
ρρ +−+−+






+
⋅+
⋅−





+
⋅+
⋅=
− AAA  
 
Corollary 3. Increasing marginal returns to capital must hold, once the externality 
effect is considered. Analytically, α+η>1. 
 
The above condition guarantees a positive steady state discount rate. To 
understand why this is so, take the last equation in the proof of proposition 5. Note that 
such equality requires 0
1
*
>−





+
+
−
δδρ
ηα
 if one wants *ρ  to be positive; the presented 
inequality is equivalent to [ ] δηαρ ⋅−+> 1)(* , which, in turn, requires α+η>1. 
The linearization of the model around the steady state point leads to: 
 








−
−
⋅
















+
+
⋅−+⋅
+⋅⋅
−
−




 +
⋅−+⋅
⋅
−
−+
=








−
−
+
+
*
*
1*
*
*
1
0
*
*
*
1
0
*
*
*
1
*
1
)1)(()1(1)1)((
11
cc
kk
kk
cc
kk
t
t
t
t
ρδρηα
ρρθ
ρρδρηα
ρθ
ρρ
ρ
  (16) 
 
Stability conditions are given by proposition 6.  
 
Proposition 6. The model with socially determined time preference and 
technological externalities is locally indeterminate if the following conditions hold: 
0)1()1)(()1()2(2
*
11*
*
*
1
0
*
* >





+⋅++
+
⋅−+⋅
+⋅⋅
−
−+⋅ ρρρδρηα
ρρθ
ρρρ
k
; 
0)1)(( *1*
*
0
*
>





⋅−
+
⋅−+⋅
− ρρδρηα
θ
ρρ
k
; 
0)1( 0* <+⋅− ρρθ . 
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Proof: Trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix in (16) are, respectively, 






+
+
⋅−+⋅
+⋅⋅
−
−+= 1*
*
*
1
0
*
* )1)(()1(2)( ρ
δρηα
ρρθ
ρρρ
k
JTr  and 
θ
ρρ
θ
θ 0*11)( +⋅−+=JDet . 
The conditions in the proposition are the direct result of considering stability relations 
0)()(1 >++ JDetJTr , 0)()(1 >+− JDetJTr  and 0)(1 >− JDet , into the discussed 
setup 
 
Corollary 4. Two of the necessary conditions for indeterminacy are: 
i) ( ) **0*
*
)()(
)()()1)(( ρδρ
ρρηα
δηαδρηα >+⋅
−⋅+
⋅+−+
⋅−+ ; 
ii) 
θ
ρρ
−
>
1
0*
. 
The first inequality is equivalent to the second condition in proposition 6, while 
the second is obtained directly from the third condition in proposition 6, i.e.,  
0)(1 >− JDet . Observe that this last inequality requires θ<1. 
 
Let us consider a numerical example to confirm the possibility of local 
indeterminacy. We assume α=0.3, η=0.8, 04.0* =ρ , 05.01 =ρ  and δ=0.067. To obey 
to the first condition of corollary 4, one should have 0319.00 >ρ ; we consider 
035.00 =ρ . Relatively to the value of A, the last relation in the proof of proposition 5 is 
equivalent to: [ ] [ ]
)(1
)(1/1
*
)(1/)(
*
1
0
*
ηα
ηαηαηα
δρ
ηαδδρ
ηα
ρ
ρρ
+−
+−+−+




















+
+
⋅−





+
+
−
=A  , which, for the 
selected parameter values will be A=0.0863. 
Under this numerical example, steady state values of variables are 1.0* =c  and 
3098.3* =k  and the Jacobian matrix is 





−
−
=
θθ /0051.01/0003.0
104.1
J . The respective 
trace and determinant come: θ/0051.004.2)( −=JTr  and θ/005.004.1)( −=JDet . 
The computation of stability conditions lead to the result of local indeterminacy for 
0.0025<θ<0.125. The system is saddle-path stable for θ<0.0025 and unstable if 
θ>0.125. This result is represented graphically in figure 3; the line in this graphic is 
9608.0)(9804.0)( −⋅= JTrJDet . 
Socially Determined Time Preference in Discrete Time 20 
 
 
*** Figure 3 *** 
 
Local indeterminacy is found for extremely low values of θ (extremely high 
values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and for values of 0ρ  near *ρ . 
 
6. Endogenous Labor Supply and Endogenous Growth 
 
A last exercise consists in assuming leisure as an argument of the utility function, 
that is, we assume a leisure-labor trade-off and an optimal selection of the allocation of 
time by the representative agent. This variation from our benchmark model follows 
Meng’s specification in the sense that it takes the economy wide level of income as the 
only argument of the discount function, but it departs from such specification by 
considering endogenous growth, i.e., an AK production function. Therefore, the 
stability result can be explored in a hybrid framework: we have seen that endogenous 
discounting and endogenous growth did not produce indeterminacy under the 
conventional Ramsey optimal growth model; here, we may investigate if this result 
continues to hold if workload optimization is considered along with consumption 
optimization. 
Assume that the representative agent solves the following maximization problem: 
 
∑ ∏+∞
= = 











⋅=
0 0
0 )(),(
t
t
v
vtt YcUMaxU βl  (17) 
 
In problem (17), variable lt∈(0,1) is the share of the representative agent’s time 
associated to labor, and thus 1-lt will be the share of time allocated to leisure (we 
assume that the representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, and thus the 
referred shares coincide with the amount of time that the agent spends working and 
resting). We consider a utility function that is concave regarding consumption but linear 
in terms of leisure. Taking m>0, the adopted functional form is:  
( ) )1()1/(1),( 1 tttt mccU ll −⋅+−−= − θθ .  
The resource constraint is, again, (2), but now the production function is 
ttttt kAkfy ll ⋅⋅== ),( . This production function reveals that there are constant 
marginal returns of capital (it is an AK function) and that only a part of the available 
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working hours are effectively used to generate wealth, i.e., if all the agent’s available 
time was allocated to work, then tt kAy ⋅= ; in reality, only a fraction of the available 
time is allocated to the production of final goods and therefore only a fraction of the 
potential output is effectively produced. 
The discount factor is, in this case, )1/(1)( tY ρβ += , with tt Y⋅−= 20 ρρρ . 
The Hamiltonian function of this problem is (qt is a co-state variable), 
 
[ ]ttttttttttt kckfqYcUqck ⋅−−⋅⋅+=ℵ + δβ ),()(),(),,,( 1 lll  (18) 
 
First-order conditions come,  
 
θβ −+ =⋅⇒=ℵ ttc cqY 1)(0  (19) 
 
t
t kA
mqY
⋅
=⋅⇒=ℵ +1)(0 βl  (20) 
 
[ ] 11 )(1)( ++ ⋅⋅−⋅+=⇒−ℵ=−⋅ tttktt qYAqqqY βδβ l  (21) 
 
0)(lim =⋅⋅
+∞→
t
t
t
t
qYk β   (transversality condition) (22) 
 
As in previous cases, Yt=yt in equilibrium, i.e., )()( tyY ββ = . From the optimality 
conditions, one  withdraws the following system of difference equations, 
 
t
t
ttt k
m
kAkAk ⋅−+




 ⋅
−⋅⋅=+ )1(
/1
1 δ
θ
l  (23) 
 






−−
⋅
⋅=
+
+ )1()(
1 1
1 δβ tt
t
t ky
k
A
l  (24) 
 
with 
θ/1





 ⋅
=
m
kA
c tt . System (23)-(24) has some relevant differences relatively to the 
models one has analyzed before. There is a contemporaneous relation between 
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consumption and stock of capital and therefore we need to analyze the dynamic 
behavior of only one of these variables, but another endogenous variable with attached 
dynamic motion arises: the share of labor time.  
To study the dynamics of the model, we begin by stating assumption 4.  
 
Assumption 4. The steady state discount rate is some constant 0
* ρρ < . 
 
With assumption 4, proposition 7 comes 
 
Proposition 7. In the socially determined time preference endogenous growth 
model with endogenous labor supply, under assumption 4 the steady state exists and it 
is unique. 
 
Proof: Defining the steady state as the long run locus for which tt kkk =≡ +1
*
, 
tt ccc =≡ +1
*
 and tt lll =≡ +1
*
, we make use of the discount function, of equations 
(23) and (24) and of the relation between capital and consumption withdrawn from 
optimality conditions, to compute the following unique values: )(1 ** δρ +⋅=
A
l , 
)( *2
*
0*
δρρ
ρρ
+⋅
−
=k  and 
θ
δρρ
ρρ






+⋅
−
⋅= )( *2
*
0*
m
A
c  
 
The steady state result imposes a specific value for the balanced growth path of 
the equilibrium discount rate. This is such that the technology level has to be given by 
1
*
2
*
0*
)()(
−






+⋅
−
⋅⋅=
θ
θ
δρρ
ρρρmA . 
Linearizing in the steady state vicinity, 
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⋅
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

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⋅
+⋅
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⋅⋅
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




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

−
−
+
+
*
*
*
*
0*
*
0
***
2
*
2
*
0*
*
1
*
1
11)(
)1()1()(
)(
11
llll t
t
t
t kk
A
A
kk
δρ
ρρρ
ρρθ
ρρθδρρ
δρρ
ρρρ
θ
θ
  (25) 
 
Proposition 8. The indeterminacy conditions of the endogenous growth / 
endogenous time preference / endogenous labor supply model are the following: 
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i) 
δρ
ρρρρ
ρθ
+
−
⋅−⋅++
⋅
>
*
*
0*
0
*
233
2
; 
ii) )()2()(
)(
*
00
**
*
0
ρρρρδρ
ρδρθ
−+−⋅⋅+
⋅+
< ; 
iii) 
0
***
0
**
0
)()1()(
)(
ρδρρρρ
ρρρθ
⋅+−+⋅−
⋅−
> ; 
iv) δ
ρρρ
−
+⋅
>
1
)1( **
0 . 
 
Proof: Trace and determinant of the matrix in system (25) are 
δρ
ρρρ
θ
θ
+
−
−⋅
−⋅
+=
*
*
0*122)(JTr  and 





⋅
−
+⋅
+
−
−+= *
*
*
0
0
111)( ρ
θ
θ
δρ
ρρρJDet . The 
first stability condition in the proposition is directly computed from 
0)()(1 >++ JDetJTr , the second from 0)()(1 >+− JDetJTr  and the third from 
0)(1 >− JDet ; the fourth condition in the proposition is a necessary condition for 
0)(1 >− JDet  to hold 
 
Corollary 5. Parameters A, m and ρ2 are irrelevant for the analysis of stability. 
This is a straightforward conclusion that one reaches by looking at the expressions of 
the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix in (25). 
 
Under reasonable parameter values, local indeterminacy is absent. To confirm this, 
take, as usual, δ=0.067, and consider 03.0* =ρ  (other numerical examples for other 
reasonable values of these two parameters produce a similar result of no indeterminacy; 
given the practical impossibility of presenting meaningful general results, we just 
explore this example). For the chosen parameter values, condition iv) in proposition 8 
implies that 0331.00 >ρ ; for conditions ii) and iii) to be simultaneously satisfied, we 
must have 0327.00 <ρ . The two constraints on the value of ρ0 are incompatible, and 
thus the requirements for local indeterminacy are not fulfilled.  
Take, for instance, 032.00 =ρ . This value satisfies one of the boundary 
conditions on the parameter but not the other. In this example, θ/03.00394.2)( −=JTr  
and θ/0006.00108.1)( +=JDet ; the trace-determinant line is 
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)(02.005.1)( JTrJDet ⋅−= . Now, assume 034.00 =ρ ; in this case, the first constraint 
on ρ0 is satisfied but the second is not. The trace is θ/03.00188.2)( −=JTr  and the 
determinant is θ/0012.09915.0)( +=JDet ; now, one has the following relation: 
)(04.0072.1)( JTrJDet ⋅−= . By violating two different stability conditions, the 
computed trace-determinant relations are incompatible with the existence of local 
indeterminacy. Figure 4 presents these two lines, revealing that the inverted triangle of 
stability is not crossed by any of them. 
 
*** Figure 4 *** 
 
Figure 4 represents solely the quadrant of the trace-determinant relation where 
these are both positive. The relevant point is that the two presented lines are bounded 
for small intervals of values of trace and determinant, in order to allow for a positive 
and finite value for θ. We observe that for admissible values of this parameter the 
system is, in the first case ( 032.00 =ρ ) unstable, and in the second case ( 034.00 =ρ ) 
saddle-path stable. Thus, saddle-path stability is admissible for values of ρ0 relatively 
far (and above) *ρ .  
 
7. Global Dynamics 
 
Two dimensional dynamic systems in discrete time are known to eventually 
produce nonlinear long term motion. Cycles of various periodicities, quasi-periodicity 
and chaos may arise after the transition from fixed-point stability to instability or 
saddle-path stability, through a bifurcation process. Global dynamics can only be 
addressed resorting to numerical examples (i.e., with concrete values attributed to the 
various parameters). Recovering the examples of previous sections, it is possible to 
investigate if the found bifurcation points mean the occurrence of cycles or if, as the 
local analysis shows, the transition from stability to instability is the only dynamic 
feature that is encountered. By exploring the different examples, one finds that cycles 
arise solely on the production externalities model.1 The endogenous cycles appear 
below the lower bound of the interval of values of θ that allow for stability. The flip 
                                                 
1
 This analysis was made resorting to IDMC software (interactive Dynamical Model Calculator). This is a 
free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and copyright of M. Lines and A. Medio. 
The figures in this section were drawn using this software. 
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bifurcation, occurring at θ=0.0025, triggers a process of period doubling bifurcations 
that leads to chaotic motion for extremely small values of the parameter of the utility 
function. 
Figure 5 displays the respective bifurcation diagram (confirm that the bifurcation 
point is, in fact, θ=0.0025). Figures 6, 7 and 8 complement the graphical presentation 
by representing an attracting set (the set of long term values to which the system 
converges) and the long term time series of consumption and capital. These last three 
figures are presented for a value of θ for which chaos exists – in this illustration, 
consumption and capital time series will never converge to the steady state and they will 
not, as well, diverge to infinity.  
As a result, we might say that endogenous time preference can generate long term 
endogenous business cycles but only under some extreme circumstances (externalities 
in the production of final goods and an extremely high elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution). 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We have explored a standard discrete time optimal control growth model, where 
the rate of time preference is endogenous and socially determined. The representative 
agent intertemporal preference is influenced by the aggregate level of consumption 
(more economy wide consumption increases individual impatience) and by the 
aggregate level of income (an economy with a higher capacity to generate wealth exerts 
a positive effect over individual patience). Several versions of the model were 
addressed, namely Ramsey-like neo-classical and endogenous growth setups (where 
endogenous discounting was modelled through, both, a linear discount rate function and 
a linear discount factor function), a framework where externalities in the production of 
final goods were assumed and, finally, a scenario with leisure as an argument of the 
utility function. 
We have confirmed the continuous time result of local indeterminacy as a stability 
result frequently obtained. In terms of local dynamics, the conventional neo-classical 
model and the externalities model allow for a variety of stability results (indeterminacy / 
fixed-point stability, saddle-path stability and indeterminacy), depending on values of 
parameters. Endogenous growth models with endogenous time preference lead to a 
bifurcation result independently of parameter values, and thus local indeterminacy never 
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holds. The endogenous leisure model can present unstable or saddle-path stable 
dynamic outcomes, however indeterminacy was not encountered. 
The only model where bifurcations lead to cycles and chaotic motion is the one 
with increasing returns due to production externalities. In this model, we regard that an 
extremely high elasticity of intertemporal substitution implies a flip bifurcation that 
leads to a period doubling route to chaos. Therefore, the socially determined time 
preference framework is capable of generating long term endogenous fluctuations, but 
these are, in fact, a rare phenomenon under the discussed type of modelling 
specification. 
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Figure 1 – Trace-determinant relation in the neo-classical growth model with a linear discount rate 
function (A=0.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Trace-determinant relation in the neo-classical growth model with a linear discount rate 
function (A=0.4). 
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Figure 3 – Trace-determinant relation in the model with productive externalities. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Trace-determinant relation in the model with endogenous labor supply. 
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Figure 5 – Bifurcation diagram (externalities model). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Attractor, θ=0.0015 (externalities model). 
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Figure 7 – Consumption long term time series, θ=0.0015 (externalities model). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Capital long term time series, θ=0.0015 (externalities model). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
